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ABSTRACT
Innovation development, production, distribution and consumption networks can 
be built up horizontally – with actors consisting only of innovation users (more 
precisely, “user/self-manufacturers”).   Some open source software projects are 
examples of such networks, and examples can be found in the case of physical 
products as well.  In this paper we discuss three conditions under which user 
innovation networks can function entirely independently of manufacturers. We 
then explore related empirical evidence and conclude that conditions favorable to 
horizontal user innovation networks are often present in the economy.
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Horizontal innovation networks -
by and for users
1.0 Introduction
Innovation development, production, distribution and consumption networks that 
are distributed horizontally across many software users exist in the field of “free” and 
“open source” software projects, 1 and in many other fields as well.  These horizontal user 
innovation networks have a great advantage over the manufacturer-centric innovation 
development systems that have been the mainstay of commerce for hundreds of years: 
they enable each using entity, whether an individual or a corporation, to develop exactly 
what it wants rather than being restricted to available marketplace choices or relying on a 
specific manufacturer to act as its (often very imperfect) agent.  Moreover, individual 
users do not have to develop everything they need on their own: they can benefit from 
innovations developed by others and freely shared within and beyond the user network.
In the functional sources of innovation lexicon, economic actors are defined in 
terms of the way in which they expect to derive benefit from a given innovation. Thus, 
“users” are firms or individual consumers that expect to benefit from using a product or a 
1 “Free” or “open source” software means that a user possessing a copy has the legal right to use it, to 
study the software’s source code, to modify the software, and to distribute modified or unmodified versions 
to others.  A software author uses his or her own copyright to guarantee these rights to all users by 
affixing any of a number of standard licensing notices, such as “Copyleft,” to the code.  Well-known 
examples of free or open source software are the GNU/Linux computer operating system, Perl 
programming language, and Internet e-mail engine SendMail (Raymond 1999).  
The practice of granting extensive rights to users via licensing began with the free software movement 
started by Richard Stallman in the early 1980s.  Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF) to 
counter the trend towards proprietary development of software packages and release of software without 
accompanying source code.   The open source movement was started in 1998 by a number of prominent 
computer “hackers” such as Bruce Perens and Eric Raymond.  This group had some political differences 
with the free software movement, but agreed in general with the licensing practices it had pioneered, and 
also had new ideas as to how to spread these practices more broadly.
Many thousands of free and open source software projects exist today and the number is growing rapidly. 
A repository of open source projects, Sourceforge.net, lists in excess of 40,000 projects and more than 
400,000 registered users. Implementing new projects is becoming progressively easier as effective project 
design becomes better understood and prepackaged infrastructural support for such projects, such as is 
provided by SourceForge, becomes available on the Web.
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service. In contrast, “manufacturers” expect to benefit from selling a product or a service. 
Innovation user and innovation manufacturer are the two general functional relationships 
between innovator and innovation. Users are unique in that they alone benefit directly 
from innovations. All others (here lumped under the term “manufacturers”) must sell 
innovation-related products or services to users, indirectly or directly, in order to profit 
from innovations. Thus, in order to profit, inventors must sell or license knowledge related 
to innovations, and manufacturers must sell products or services incorporating 
innovations. Similarly, suppliers of innovation-related materials or services must sell the 
materials or services in order to profit from the innovations.  (For example, an oil supplier 
benefits from the development of an improved oil lamp via increased sales of oil.)  
 By user “network” we mean user nodes interconnected by information transfer 
links which may involve face-to-face, electronic or any other form of communication. 
User networks can exist within the boundaries of a membership group but need not.  User 
innovation networks also may, but need not, incorporate the qualities of  user 
“communities” for participants, where these are defined as “…networks of interpersonal 
ties that provide sociability, support, information, a sense of belonging, and social 
identity.” (Wellman 2002 p. 4).
It is our contention that complete fully-functional innovation networks can be built 
up horizontally – with actors consisting only of innovation users (more precisely, 
“user/self-manufacturers”).  Users participating in the network design and build innovative 
products for their own use – and also freely reveal their design information to others. 
Those others then replicate and improve the innovation that has been revealed and freely 
reveal their improvements in turn – or they may simply replicate the product design that 
has been revealed and adopt it for their own, in-house use.
Non-users also may contribute to what we are calling user innovation networks. 
For example, in the case of open source software innovation networks, manufacturers of 
complementary goods and purveyors of complementary services can be motivated to 
contribute, if and as the innovations they freely reveal enhance profits from what they sell 
(E.g., manufacturers of proprietary computer hardware can have an incentive to create 
and contribute novel open source software that will improve the link between a popular 
open source software program and their proprietary hardware.)  (Harhoff et al 2003). 
Also, computer programmers that have no use for the software they are developing may 
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contribute, driven by enjoyment of the work itself, reputation effects, etc. (Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002).  It is also the case that users may apply pre-existing products commercially 
produced by manufacturers and/or apply pre-existing commercial processes to create or 
reproduce user innovations.  It is only our contention that innovation-specific investments 
and activities by such non-users are not essential, and that horizontal, distributed 
innovation networks containing only user participants can be fully functional.
Specifically, we propose that user-only innovation development, production, 
distribution and consumption networks can flourish when (1) at least some users have 
sufficient incentive to innovate, (2) at least some users have an incentive to voluntarily 
reveal information sufficient to enable others to reproduce their innovations, and (3) user-
self production can compete with commercial production and distribution. When only the 
first two conditions hold, we propose that a pattern of user innovation and trial will occur 
within user networks, followed by commercial manufacture and distribution of innovations 
that prove to be of general interest.  In this paper we will explore these matters and will 
attempt to show that conditions favorable to user innovation networks often do exist in 
the real world economy.
1.1 Examples of user innovation networks
User innovation networks have existed long before and extend far beyond open 
source software. Such communities can be found developing physical products as well. 
Consider and compare the following two examples of early stage user innovation 
networks, the first in software, the second in sports.  Note especially their “user-only” 
nature with respect to both innovation development, the diffusion of innovation-related 
information, and innovation self-manufacture.
Apache Server Software
Apache open source software is used on web server computers that host web 
pages and provide content requested by Internet browsers. Such computers are the 
backbone of the Internet-based World Wide Web infrastructure.
The server software that evolved into Apache was developed by University of 
Illinois undergraduate Rob McCool for, and while working at, the National Center 
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for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). The source code as developed and 
periodically modified by McCool was posted on the web so that users at other sites 
could download, use, and modify and further develop it.  
When McCool departed NCSA in mid-1994, a small group of web masters who 
had adopted his server software for their own sites decided to take on the task of 
continued development. A core group of eight users gathered all documentation 
and bug fixes and issued a consolidated patch. This patchy web server software 
evolved over time into Apache. Extensive user feedback and modification yielded 
Apache 1.0, released on December 1, 1995.  
In the space of  four years and after many modifications and improvements 
contributed by many users, Apache has become the most popular web server 
software on the Internet, garnering many industry awards for excellence.  Despite 
strong competition from commercial software developers such as Microsoft and 
Netscape, it is currently in use by about 70% of the millions of web sites 
worldwide.
Rodeo Kayaking
Rodeo kayaking involves using specialized kayaks to perform acrobatic “moves” 
or “tricks” such as spins and flips in rough whitewater. Heinerth (2006) reports 
that the originator of rodeo kayaking was an avid kayaker named Walt Blackader. 
Blackader was the first to focus in a sustained and serious way on developing 
methods to “play” in really big whitewater in a kayak.  He began evolving his 
techniques between 1968 and 1970 using standard fiberglass alpine kayaks 
produced commercially by local manufacturers.  Later, other “extreme paddlers” 
joined him and formed a small community.  Additional, similar communities of 
enthusiasts began to form soon thereafter.  
Commercial products developed specifically for rodeo kayaking did not exist for 
several years. Instead, rodeo kayakers designed and built the specialized kayaks 
and related gear and safety equipment that they needed for themselves.  They also 
shared their innovation-related information openly with other users who also “built 
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their own.”  With the passage of time, some community members became small-
scale user-manufacturers who built copies of their designs for fellow users upon 
request.  Then, as the sport and potential market expanded further, large-scale 
commercial manufacturing of user-developed kayak designs commenced. By 2002, 
approximately 50,000 rodeo kayaks were purchased from commercial 
manufacturers, with many others being “home made.” (Hienerth 2006, Baldwin et 
al. 2006).
Both of these user innovation networks have evolved and become more complex 
over time. Today, although they look different on the surface, they are in fact very similar 
in fundamental ways.  Both now include many thousands of volunteer participants. 
Participants in open source software projects interact primarily via the Internet using 
specialized websites that volunteer users have set up for their use.  Participants in sports 
innovation networks tend to interact by physically traveling to favorite sports sites and to 
contests designed for their sport.  Most users of open source software simply “use the 
code,” relying on interested volunteers to write new code, debug others' code, answer 
requests for help posted on Internet help sites, and help coordinate the project.  Similarly, 
most participants in an evolving sport simply “play the game,” relying on those so inclined 
to develop new techniques and equipment, try out and improve innovations developed by 
others, voluntarily provide coaching, and help coordinate network activities such as 
leagues and contests.  Participants that do innovate tend to freely reveal their innovations 
to all participants, including free riders.
As user innovation networks grow and mature, commercial enterprises attach to or 
assume complementary roles to user innovation networks.  Red Hat and VA Software are 
well-known examples of commercial involvement in the open source software context. 
Manufacturers of products first developed and self-manufactured by user-innovators are 
examples in the case of sports (Shah 2000, Hienerth 2006, Baldwin et al. 2006)
In the remainder of this paper we will explore the phenomenon of and the 
economics of “user-only” innovation networks by exploring what is known about each of 
our three basic conditions in turn.  We will first review findings on innovation by users 
(section 2).  Next, we will explore findings regarding the free revealing of innovations by 
users (section 3). Third, we will explore the conditions under which user-self production 
6
can compete with commercial production and distribution (section 4).  We then conclude 
by discussing some implications of horizontal, distributed innovation networks “by and for 
users themselves” (section 5). 
2.0  Condition 1: Some users innovate
Innovation manufacturers rather than innovation users have traditionally been 
considered the most logical locus of innovation for products and services, because private 
financial incentives to innovate seem to be higher for them than for individual or corporate 
users.  After all, a manufacturer has the opportunity to sell what it develops to an entire 
marketplace of users while spreading development costs over a large number if units sold. 
A user-innovator, on the other hand, can typically expect to benefit financially only from 
its own internal use of its innovation.  Benefiting from diffusion of an innovation to other 
users in a marketplace has been traditionally assumed to require some form of intellectual 
property protection followed by licensing.   Both matters are costly to attempt, with very 
uncertain outcomes.
Despite this traditional expectation, empirical studies of the sources of innovation 
in both industrial and consumer goods fields have shown that in many but not all of the 
fields studied, users rather than manufacturers are typically the initial developers of what 
later become commercially significant new products and processes (table 1).
Table 1: Empirical studies of functional sources
of commercially-important Innovations
Innovative
Study Nature of Innovations and 
Sample Selection Criteria
Product Developed by: a
N User Mfr. Other
Knight (1963) Computer innovations 1944-1962:
- systems reaching new performance high 143 25% 75%
- systems with radical structural innovations 18 33% 67%
Enos (1962) Major petroleum processing innovations 7 43% 14% 43%b
Freeman (1968) Chemical processes and process equipment
 available for license, 1967
810 70% 30%
Berger (1975) All engineering polymers developed in U.S.
after 1955 with > 106 lbs. Produced in 1975
6 0% 100%
Boyden (1976) Chemical additives for plastics - all 
plasticizers and UV stabilizers developed 
16 0% 100%
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post
 World War 2 for use with 4 major polymers
Lionetta (1977) All pultrusion processing machinery
 innovations first introduced commercially 
1940-1976 which offered users
 a major increment in functional utilityC
13 85% 15%
Shah (2000) All important innovations in snowboarding,
 windsurfing and skateboarding equipment 
- first of type (e.g., first skateboard) 3 100% 0% 0%
- major improvements 45 58%d 27% 15%
von Hippel (1976) Scientific instrument innovations: 
- first of type (e.g., first NMR) 4 100% 0%
- major functional improvements 44 82% 18%
- minor functional improvements 63 70% 30%
von Hippel (1977) Semiconductor and electronic subassembly
 manufacturing equipment:
- first of type used in commercial production 7 100% 0%
- major functional improvements 22 63% 21% 16% e
- minor functional improvements 20 59% 29% 12% e
VanderWerf (1982) Wirestripping and connector attachment 
Equipment
20 11% 33% 56% f
a NA data excluded from percentage computations. 
bAttributed to independent b inventors/invention development companies.
c Figures shown are based on reanalysis of Lionetta's (1977) data.
d Includes innovations by users and by “user/manufacturers” that made a small number of copies for others 
to support their pursuit of their sport (called “lifestyle” firms by Shah).
eAttributed to joint user-manufacturer innovation projects.
f Attributed to connector suppliers.  
In the specific case of open source software projects, software users are frequent 
contributors of software code.  Thus, Niedner et al (2000) report that contributors of code 
to open source projects asked to agree or disagree with statements regarding their 
possible motivations for this ranked gain from “facilitating my work due to better 
software” as the highest-ranked benefit (average level of  respondent agreement with that 
statement was 4.7 on a scale of 5).  Similarly, 59% of contributors to OS projects sampled 
by Lakhani and Wolf (2005) report that use of the output they create is one of the three 
most important incentives inducing them to innovate.
Table 2: Proportion of users innovating in diverse product categories
Innovation Area No. Users Sampled % Developing and 
building innovation for 
own use
Industrial Products
Printed Circuit CAD 136 user firm attendees at 24.3%
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Software (a) PC-CAD conference
Pipe Hanger Hardware (b) 74
Pipe hanger installation 
firms
36%
Library Information 
Systems (c)
102 Australian  Libraries 
using computerized library 
information systems
26%
Apache OS server 
software security 
features (d)
131 Apache users 19.1%
Consumer Products
Outdoor Consumer 
Products (e)
153 outdoor specialty mail 
order catalog recipients
9.8%
“Extreme” sporting 
equipment (f) 
197 expert users 37.8%
Mountain biking 
equipment (g)
291 expert users 19.2%
Kitesurfing equipment (f) 157 members of the 
Australian Kite Surfing 
Association
28%
Sources of Data: (a) Urban and von Hippel (1988); (b) Herstatt and von Hippel (1992); (c) Morrison, 
Roberts and von Hippel (2000); (d) Franke and von Hippel (2003); (e) Lüthje (2004); (f) Franke and Shah 
(2003); (g) Lüthje, Herstatt and von Hippel (2005); (f) Tietz et al (2005).
Studies that have examined the frequency of innovation among user populations 
have found that user innovation is not a rare event: from 10% to nearly 40% of user 
respondents report developing a new product for personal or in-house use in fields studied 
to date (table 2).  
These same empirical studies also find that innovation by users tends to be 
concentrated among “lead users” of the products and processes focused upon.  Lead users 
are defined as users of a given product or service type that combine two characteristics: 
(1) lead users expect attractive innovation-related benefits from a solution to their needs 
and so are motivated to innovate, and (2) lead users experience needs that will become 
general in a marketplace, but experience them months or years earlier than the majority of 
the target market (von Hippel 1986).  Note that lead users are not the same as early 
adopters of an innovation.  They are typically ahead of the entire adoption curve in that 
they experience needs before any responsive commercial products exist – and therefore 
often develop their own solutions.
2.1 Economics of innovation by users
9
We have now seen that users do often innovate.  Presumably therefore, some 
users, at least some of the time, must expect innovation to be profitable.  Research on 
innovation-related incentives and capabilities provides a reasonable explanation for the 
empirical observations regarding innovation by users in general and by lead users in 
particular.   With respect to innovation by users rather than manufacturers, it has been 
shown that in some product categories users may reasonably expect a higher reward from 
innovating than can manufacturers.  For example, if a user firm develops a new process 
machine for in-house use that will enable it to be first to market with a major new product 
line, it may make more profit from that machine than would a manufacturer-innovator 
(von Hippel 1988).  
Second, user innovation costs can be significantly lower than manufacturer 
innovation costs when the problem-solving work of innovation developers requires access 
to “sticky”2 – costly to transfer - information regarding user needs and the context of use. 
Such information is located predominantly at user sites and can be most cheaply accessed 
by problem-solvers located at those sites (von Hippel 1994).  Ogawa (1997) has shown 
that the location of sticky information drawn upon by problem-solvers can significantly 
affect the locus of innovation.  Riggs and von Hippel (1994) have shown that “functionally 
novel” innovations (which logically are those likely to draw upon a greater proportion of 
sticky user information) are significantly more likely to be developed by users rather than 
by manufacturers.  
The impact of these two factors on the locus of innovation also allows us to 
understand and predict that user innovation will not be present or will be infrequent in 
product categories such as engineering plastics (c.f. table 1).  Engineering plastics are 
typically a lower-cost substitute for other engineering materials – a user is seldom 
2 The stickiness of a given unit of information in a given instance is defined as the incremental 
expenditure required to transfer that unit of information to a specified locus in a form useable by a given 
information seeker.  When this cost is low, information stickiness is low; when it is high, stickiness is 
high.  A number of researchers have both argued and shown that information required by technical 
problem-solvers is indeed often costly to transfer for a range of reasons (von Hippel 1994).  The 
requirement to transfer information from its point of origin to a specified problem-solving site will not 
affect the locus of problem-solving activity when that information can be shifted at no or little cost. 
However, when it is costly to transfer from one site to another in useable form - is, in our terms sticky - 
the distribution of problem solving activities can be significantly affected.
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prevented from implementing a desired innovation for lack of a novel engineering plastic. 
Also, sticky information regarding user needs is not an issue with respect to the 
development of new engineering plastics: manufacturer-innovators know they will obtain 
success in the marketplace if they can achieve improvements along dimensions of merit 
known to be valued by users such as cost or strength of materials.
The concentration of innovation activity among lead users within the user 
population can also be understood from an economic perspective.  Given that innovation 
is an economically motivated activity (Schmookler 1966, Mansfield 1968), those users 
expecting significantly higher economic or personal benefit from developing an innovation 
– one of the two characteristics of lead users – have a higher incentive to and so are more 
likely to innovate.  Also, given that lead users experience needs in advance of the bulk of a 
target market, the nature, risks, and eventual size of that target market are often not clear 
to manufacturers.  This lack of clarity can reduce manufacturers’ incentives to innovate, 
and increase the likelihood that lead users will be the first to develop their own innovative 
solutions for needs that later prove to represent mainstream market demand (Franke et al. 
2006).
In the specific instance of open source software, software users can profit by using 
the software improvements that they develop.  In contrast, there is no commercial market 
for open source software – because open source software developers make their 
innovations freely available as a public good.  This eliminates manufacturers’ direct path to 
appropriating returns from private investment in developing open source products.  Recall, 
however that manufacturers may find indirect paths to profiting from open source 
software projects and so may contribute to them.  For example, Red Hat profits by 
distributing and providing support services for many open source software programs. IBM 
profits by selling proprietary software and hardware that complements open source 
software programs like GNU/Linux.
3.0  Condition 2: Some users freely reveal
We next turn to exploring users’ options with respect to reaping profits from their 
innovations.  Users in principle have a choice among three such options: they may license 
their innovation to others (and/or “license to themselves” and manufacture their 
innovation for the market); they may keep it secret and profit from in-house use; or they 
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may choose to “freely reveal” their innovation-related information so that others may 
replicate the innovation if they wish to do so.
When we say that an innovator freely reveals proprietary information, we mean 
that all existing and potential intellectual property rights to that information are voluntarily 
given up by that innovator and all interested parties are given access to it – the information 
becomes a public good.  Thus, free revealing of information by a possessor is defined as 
the granting of access to all interested agents without imposition of any direct payment. 
For example, placement of non-patented information in a publicly-accessible site such as a 
journal or public website would be free revealing under this definition (Harhoff et al, 
2003).3  (Revealing of open source software is is not quite free according to this stringent 
definition, but the economic effects are similar.  Licenses granted to users of open source 
software do place some constraints upon adopters in order to forestall possible strategies 
that could result in “taking the code private” (O’Mahoney 2003).)
Empirical studies show innovating users often choose to freely reveal detailed 
information sufficient to reproduce their innovations to other users and to manufacturers 
as well.  Von Hippel and Finkelstein (1979) found this practice among users of clinical 
chemistry analyzer equipment produced by the Technicon Corporation; Allen (1983) 
found furnace design information openly revealed by iron producers in the 19th century 
iron-making industry, Lim (2000) reports that IBM freely revealed information on its 
“copper interconnect” semiconductor process and equipment innovations to equipment 
manufacturing firms and thereby to competing users; Morrison et al (2000) found 
3 “Free revealing” as so defined does not mean that recipients necessarily acquire and utilize the revealed 
information at no cost to themselves. Recipients may, for example, have to pay for a journal subscription 
or an Internet connection or a field trip to acquire the information being freely revealed.  Also, some may 
have to obtain complementary information or other assets in order to fully understand that information or 
put it to use.  However, if the information possessor does not profit from any such expenditures made by 
information adopters, the information itself is still freely revealed, according to our definition. 
Conversely, note that innovators may sometimes choose to subsidize the acquisition and evaluation and 
use of their freely-revealed information by others.  For example, a firm may invest in extensive and 
expensive lobbying to get others to adopt an technical standard it has developed.  Similarly, writers of 
computer code that they freely reveal may work very hard to document their code in a way that is very 
easy for potential adopters to understand.  Such subsidization efforts do not affect the status of the 
information itself as being freely revealed according to our definition.
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improvements to library information software freely revealed by libraries; Franke and Shah 
(2003) found the detailed design of user-developed innovations being freely revealed 
within communities of sports enthusiasts.  And, of course, contributors to open source 
projects are also known to freely reveal the novel software code they have developed at 
private expense to fellow innovators and to free riders on equal terms (e.g., Raymond 
1999, Lerner and Tirole 2002).
Free revealing of innovation-related information can be the dominant way 
innovations are diffused in some fields and under some conditions.  Thus, Franke and Shah 
(2003) studied patterns of user innovation sharing in four communities of serious sports 
enthusiasts.  Innovators in these communities quite universally agreed with the statement 
that they shared their innovation with their entire community free of charge – and strongly 
disagreed with the statement that they sold their innovations (p<0.001, t-test for 
dependent samples) 
3.1 Economic case for free  revealing
To economists, free revealing of innovation-related information is surprising, 
because it violates a central tenant of the economic theory of innovation. In this classical 
view, appropriating returns to innovation requires innovators to keep the knowledge 
underlying an innovation secret or to protect it by patents or other means.  After all, non-
compensated spillovers of innovation-related information should represent a loss that 
innovators would seek to avoid if at all possible, even at some cost. Why then do we 
observe that some innovation-related information is voluntarily freely revealed?
In this section, we briefly summarize available empirical studies and conclude that 
this question should be turned on its head:  Why did we ever think that free revealing of 
innovation-related information would not be common?  Extant studies show that it is often 
not practical to benefit from intellectual property via either licensing or secrecy – even if 
innovators should wish to do this.  Existing research also shows how innovators can often 
obtain private benefits from free revealing.  When benefits from free revealing exceed the 
benefits that are practically obtainable from licensing or secrecy, then free revealing 
should be the preferred course of action for a profit-seeking firm. 
General impracticality of licensing and trade secrecy
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To license their intellectual property, innovators must first gain some form of legal 
protection for it.  In most subject matters, the relevant form of legal protection is the 
patent grant, generally the “utility” patent (design and plant patents also exist). 4  Are 
patents an effective form of protection for innovators?  The available empirical literature 
suggests, first, that innovators do not generally think that patents offer a very effective 
form of protection for intellectual property.  A study by Scherer (1959) found only eight of 
thirty seven respondents ("executives responsible for technical change") reporting that 
patents were `very important' to their companies (Scherer 1959, 117).  This result is 
especially interesting because Scherer selected his sample only from the firms which 
presumably value patents most highly - those which hold a large number of them.  A 
similar finding was reported by Taylor and Silberston (1973), who report that 24 of the 32 
responding firms said that 5 percent or less of recent R&D expenditures would not have 
been undertaken if patent protection had not been available (ibid, p. 30).  Levin et al 
(1987) conducted a survey of 650 R&D executives in 130 different industries, and found 
that all except respondents from the chemical and pharmaceutical industries judged patents 
to be "relatively ineffective."  Similar findings are reported by Mansfield (1968, 1985) and 
reaffirmed by Cohen et al. (2000).
Consider finally the practicality of protecting an innovation as a trade secret.  As 
was the case with patents, much intellectual property does not qualify for protection as a 
trade secret because it cannot simultaneously be kept secret and exploited for economic 
gain.  All innovators can in principle keep product innovations secret while developing 
them and before putting them on the market.  However, once the product is on the 
market, the trade secrets it contains can generally be legally discovered by those skilled in 
relevant arts and so lose their status as trade secrets.  User-innovators have the additional 
possibility of  benefiting for an indefinite period from the process innovations they develop 
while keeping them secret behind their factory walls.  However, trade secrets are not likely 
4 Trade secrecy law is a form of protection applicable to innovations that can be kept secret.  Trade secrets 
can in principle be licensed to others that will maintain the secret status of the information revealed to 
them under license.  But licensing trade secrets is often impractical.  The owner must at least partially 
reveal the secret to potential buyers so that they may evaluate their potential purchase.  This incurs the 
risk of the secret becoming widely known, thus losing both its status as a trade secret and it’s value to a 
potential licensee.   In the special case of software innovations (considered a form of “writings”) copyright 
protection is applicable and widely used.  
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to remain secrets for long.  Mansfield (1985) studied a sample of 100 American firms and 
found that the period during which intellectual property can be kept secret in fact appears 
to be quite limited.  He reports that “…information concerning development decisions is 
generally in the hands of rivals within about 12 to 18 months, on the average, and 
information concerning the detailed nature and operation of a new product or process 
generally leaks out within about a year.”5 
(Software is a special case and better positioned than most other fields with 
respect to the feasibility of establishing a level of legal protection that can support the 
licensing of intellectual property.  This is due to the legal status of software as “writings,” 
which can be protected by copyright.  Copyright is a low cost and immediate form of legal 
protection – it is applicable to many forms of original writings and images and “follows the 
author’s pen across the page.”  Licensing of copyrighted software is widely practiced by 
commercial software firms.  When one “buys” a copy of a non-custom software product 
one is typically actually buying only a license to use that software rather than buying the 
intellectual property itself.  Copyright licensing is also the basis of free and open source 
software practice.  The rights that open source software users enjoy are conveyed to them 
by the software authors.  These authors use their own copyright to grant licenses to users 
that allow them to use, study, modify and distribute their code (see footnote 1).  
Sources of benefit from free revealing
Our discussions of the applicability of patent protection and trade secrecy 
protection to intellectual property appear to in most instances leave the innovator with 
only the choice between voluntary free revealing of innovation-related information now 
and involuntary free revealing later.  Given this choice, why should user-innovators choose 
5 In addition, a user-innovator may not be the only holder of “its” secret.  Note in this regard that 
Rosenberg (1976) has shown that important innovations often come from outside of the industry of 
application.  When this is so, and when innovations diffuse from one industry to another with a lag, it is 
likely that competing firms in the originating industry all will know the information and so incur no 
competitive loss relative to their rivals by revealing it to firms in other industries.
If research shows that an innovator’s secret information is also frequently know by others, then all must 
estimate that the actual likelihood of keeping the information secret depends on the choice made by the 
possessor with the least to lose (or most to gain) from revealing it.  If a holder of the secret judges that 
other possessors are likely to reveal it if they don’t, any preference that they might have to hide their 
information is rendered moot.  
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to voluntarily free reveal now?  This matter is reviewed in Harhoff et al (2003) and von 
Hippel (2005) in detail.  We provide brief overview here.  Allen (1983) argued that free 
revealing could be economically justified by profit-seeking firms on several grounds:  (1) 
gains in reputation for the firm or firm managers are sufficient to offset a reduction in firm 
operating profits caused by free revealing; (2) so many people knew the information that it 
could not have been kept secret in any case; (3) the innovation is to some extent specific 
to the innovator and so free riders would not gain advantage equal to that of the 
innovator; (4) gains in the value of assets complementary to the use or production of the 
innovation exceed losses associated with free revealing; (5) free revealing may increase the 
innovator’s profit by enlarging the overall market for the product under consideration. 
An additional class of incentives for free revealing of innovation-related 
information involves the increased diffusion of  innovations for which this has been done. 
Of course, more than innovation-related information is required to induce imitation - there 
must be an incentive to imitate and needed skills as well (Dosi 2006, 1982).  However, 
free information is  important, and when an innovating user freely reveals information 
sufficient to reproduce an innovation, one result is to increase the diffusion of that 
innovation relative to what it would be if the innovation were either licensed at a fee or 
held secret. The innovating user may then benefit from the increase in diffusion via a 
number of effects.  Among these are network effects, reputational gains, and related 
innovations induced among and revealed by other users.  In addition, an innovation about 
which information has been freely revealed can become an informal standard that may 
preempt the development and/or commercialization of other versions of the innovation. 
If, as was suggested by Allen, the innovation about which information has been revealed is 
designed in a way that is especially appropriate to conditions unique to the innovator, this 
can result in creating a permanent source of advantage for that innovator.  Note that being 
first to reveal information regarding a given type of innovation increases a user’s chances 
of having its innovation widely adopted, other things being equal.  This may induce 
innovators to race to reveal first.
Incentives to freely reveal innovation-related information have been explored in the 
specific context of open source software by Raymond (1999), Lerner and Tirole (2002) 
and others.  Incentives proposed include the likelihood that free revealing of quality code 
can increase a programmer’s reputation among peers and also among potential employers 
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– thus increasing his or her value on the job market.  Firms may also benefit from a 
reputation of being an employer of contributors to open source software projects.  (To the 
extent that the incentives of employer and employee differ on this matter, there will be 
agency issues.)  It has also been found that the cost disadvantage as perceived by 
innovators relative to free riders is likely to be low.  Those who contribute code to open 
source projects report that they benefit from the work of coding itself in terms of both 
enjoyment and learning (Lakhani and Wolf 2005).  These process benefits remain private 
even when the output of the process – the software code itself – is freely revealed (von 
Hippel and von Krogh 2003).  Finally, a number of writers have proposed that communal 
norms, including altruism, may play a strong role in inducing free revealing of information 
in the field of open source software.  For example, programmers may feel incented by 
“generalized reciprocity” (Ekeh 1974) to reveal their code because they have benefited 
from the code freely revealed by others.
Losses to innovators from free revealing come from the opportunity cost of not 
licensing or selling their software plus any advantage this action provides to competitors 
that free-ride on the innovation.  With respect to the latter, the stronger the competition 
between the user-innovator and other users of the innovation, the larger will be the loss of 
competitive advantage that the innovator incurs by revealing innovation-related 
information.  Conversely, when competition between innovation users is low, e.g. due to 
geographical separation of markets, the revealing user does not suffer as a consequence of 
the advantages he provides to others.  
The negative impact of competition on users’ willingness to free reveal has been 
documented by  Franke and Shah (2003).  Free revealing in the absence of competition 
has been explored by Morrison et al (2000) and found to be high.  These authors studied 
innovation sharing by Australian libraries that had made innovative modifications to their 
computerized library information systems (OPACs).  The libraries studied were not 
competitors in the marketplace: all were non-profit organizations and, although their 
budgets were probably partially determined by the number of patrons they attracted, they 
served markets that were non-overlapping with respect to geographic coverage and/or 
subject matter.  Morrison et al found that users had shared 56% (22 of the 39) of the 
OPAC modifications they had developed with manufacturers and/or or users.  Forty four 
percent had not been shared.  The reasons for not sharing were found unrelated to 
17
competitive issues.  Instead, study participants ascribed the fact that they had not shared 
some innovations to the lack of a convenient forum for doing so, and/or to their 
supposition that others would not have an interest in a given innovation.
4.0  Condition 3: Users can self-manufacture their innovations “cheaply”
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Our third and final condition for the emergence and successful functioning of 
horizontal, user-only innovation networks was that innovation replication by users (user-
self production) can compete with commercial production and distribution.  To achieve 
this in the case of information products simply requires the diffusion of complete products 
from the innovating users to others via the Internet or similar low-cost means. In this case 
identical, essentially costless means of reproduction and distribution are available to and 
employed by both information product manufacturers and information product users – and 
so horizontal networks of users do not require the involvement of manufacturers in these 
tasks.  In the case of physical products, the low cost diffusion of innovation-related 
information from the innovating user to others similarly can be accompished by users 
only.6  But economies of scale are often involved in the production of copies of the 
physical innovation.  This can mean that horizontal user innovation networks do require 
the involvement of manufacturers for the economical reproduction of physical product 
user innovations.
6 It is important to note that alternate low cost methods for diffusing innovation-
related information exist in many fields that are not dependent on the Internet.  Consider 
that those who share an interest in a physical or information product may physically meet 
for a range of purposes such as conferences or contests.  When this is so, costs of 
innovation-related information diffusion can be episodically very low.  Innovators can 
store their innovations for occasional batch networking and diffusion at low incremental 
cost, since the cost of coming to such a physical meeting has already been incurred.  In 
these face-to-face settings, some information transfers are easily effected that would be 
difficult to transact over the Internet.  As an example, consider again the rodeo kayaking 
innovation history we summarized at the start of this article.  In that case fellow rodeo 
kayaking enthusiasts often gathered together physically to enjoy their sport together, and 
to engage in competitions. While at such meetings, they could transfer complex, poorly-
encoded information in very low-cost, multimodal manner:  “Watch how I do this,” and 
“Run your hand along this curve I added to my kayak hull – I think it makes all the 
difference for doing the type of flip I just showed you!  Try it yourself while I watch and 
comment.”
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4.1 Economics of user self manufacture of physical products
Recall that we have proposed that user-only innovation development, production, 
distribution and consumption networks can flourish when (1) at least some users have 
sufficient incentive to innovate, (2) at least some users have an incentive to voluntarily 
reveal their innovation-related information, and (3) user-self production can compete with 
commercial production and distribution. When only the first two conditions hold, we 
proposed that a pattern of user innovation and trial will occur within user networks, 
followed by commercial manufacture and distribution of innovations that prove to be of 
general interest.  In the case of physical products, we suggest that there are two types of 
circumstances in which condition 3 will hold: first, when production volumes required are 
very small; second, when no model-specific investments are required to manufacture the 
innovation.
With respect to the first circumstance, Baldwin et al. (2006) pointed out that at 
low production volumes, users and manufacturers frequently use the same low fixed-cost, 
high variable-cost production technologies. When this is so, manufacturers will not 
necessarily be able to replicate physical products more cheaply than will individual self-
manufacturing users.  The illustration used by Baldwin et al. with respect to this point was 
the manufacture of rodeo kayaks.  (Recall from earlier in the paper that rodeo kayaking is 
a sport involving the use of specialized “rodeo kayaks” to perform acrobatic tricks such as 
spins and flips in rough whitewater.)  For many years, both users and manufacturers 
produced rodeo kayaks via identical, hand manufacturing methods.  These methods 
involved the hand “lay-up” of fiberglass matting, followed by coats of liquid plastic also 
applied by hand. Under these circumstances, user and manufacturer production costs were 
probably very similar.
20
  With respect to the second circumstance, consider that user-innovators that 
develop, produce and distribute innovations within horizontal, user-only innovation 
networks usually do these things by drawing upon inputs and platforms that incorporate 
commercially-manufactured items.  For example, users of open source software users that 
develop and distribute novel software via the Internet “from user to user” are relying on a 
platform constructed from many manufactured components – such as routers and optical 
fibers.  Similarly, users that are developing physical products in a “user-only network” buy 
standard manufactured input materials and process tools to create their self-manufactured 
products.  Thus,  user self-manufacturers of rodeo kayaks use commercially- 
manufactured glass matting and liquid plastics and various types of process tools and 
equipment to produce them.  The distinction that applies to make all of these innovations 
producible and distributable by “users only” is that all innovation-specific investments and 
activities are carried out by users only in these cases.  Pre-existing processes and tools and 
input materials produced by manufacturers as standard products may be applied by users 
during the course of these innovation-specific activities. 
Interestingly, as the use of mass customization factory methods become available 
to more fields, the concentration of innovation-specific investments and activities within 
horizontal user-only networks may apply to more product types and be competitive with 
production involving innovation-specific investments by manufacturers at steadily higher 
unit volumes.  (So called “mass-customized” production methods are based on computer-
driven production tools that can be automatically adjusted to produce down to single units 
of unique products at variable costs similar to those achievable by fixed, model-specific 
production tooling (Pine 1993).)  For example, if users can someday “print” a copy of a 
rodeo kayak on the same adjustable mass-customization process machines as 
manufacturers would use to achieve the same production task at larger market volumes, 
then it would seem reasonable that horizontal, user-only innovation networks will 
someday exist in the case of physical products as well as information products independent 
of market size.
5.0  Discussion and suggestions for further research
We have now seen that conditions favorable to horizontal, user innovation 
networks may exist in many fields.  That is: users do frequently innovate in many fields, 
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and these users appear to often have the incentives to freely reveal innovation-related 
information and means for innovation replication and distribution that are cost-competitive 
with those available to manufacturers as well.  
In this paper we have focused on exploring why users in particular might innovate 
and then freely reveal their proprietary information on user innovation networks rather 
than attempt to hide or license that information.  We have adopted this relatively narrow 
focus because it seems to us to be interesting and important to explore how and why 
innovation networks run exclusively for and by users function.   Such networks offer the 
interesting prospect of direct user to user innovation processes that can dispense with 
manufacturers as intermediaries.  It has been found that when users can innovate for 
themselves to create precisely what they want, rather than being restricted to a set of 
options on offer that have been created by others, their satisfaction is significantly higher. 
For example, Franke and von Hippel (2003) studied the relative satisfaction levels of a 
sample of users of Apache open source security software.  Controlling for levels of user 
programming skill, they found that users that had written new code to fit Apache more 
precisely to their needs were significantly more satisfied.  
There are many issues to explore if we wish to better understand the nature and 
potential of horizontal user innovation networks.  In addition to appropriate incentives, 
horizontal innovation networks must also have the appropriate problem-solving 
capabilities. Dosi et al (2000) discuss the notion of organizational capabilities, and it 
would be interesting and useful to extend this discussion to expore the capabilities enabled 
by and valuable to horizontal innovation networks.  Henkel and von Hippel (2005) have 
found that social welfare is increased when users and  manufacturers innovate as relative 
to a world in which only manufacturers innovate.  It would clearly be useful to further 
develop the social welfare benefits associated with user innovation networks.  As a related 
matter, it would also be useful to consider the implications for public policy related to 
intellectual property if such networks prove to offer social welfare benefits.  
Both of the early-stage user networks that we described at the start of this paper – 
the first in open source software and the second in sports - were user-only with respect to 
both innovation development and diffusion at their start.  At later stages product 
manufacturers began to make contributions as well, as the possibilities for profit became 
clear to them.  It may well be that new projects characteristically begin as pure user 
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innovation networks, and that later manufacturers begin to participate.  An initial 
exploration and modeling of this pattern has recently been done by Baldwin et al. (2006)
The concept of horizontal, user-only innovation networks that we have considered 
in this paper can be extended to the more general category of user content networks.  As 
is the case for user innovation networks, user content networks offer content that users 
either post as of interest to others and/or questions that users post to the network for a 
possible answer.  Such content networks exist in both user-founded and run and 
commercial forms.  Prominent examples can be found in the medical field in the form of 
specialized websites where patients and others are free to both post and download 
information on specific medical conditions.  Many variations on commercially-supported 
user content networks also exist.  Zagat.com is a website offering a compilation of 
restaurant evaluations by ordinary consumers that can be freely downloaded; 
Allexperts.com is a website offering free access to self-described experts who will provide 
information upon request.  When the service provided by such networks is simply to offer 
non-proprietary “content” in a more convenient and accessible form rather than to diffuse 
valuable innovations about which information been freely revealed, the arguments for 
participation by users and others gets considerably simpler.  One need consider only the 
costs and benefits associated with diffusion and not issues related to loss of proprietary 
intellectual property associated with the free revealing of innovation-related information.
User innovation networks assume various forms, and it will be useful to explore 
the conditions appropriate for each, and the costs and benefits that each provide.  For 
example, as was noted earlier, user innovation networks may, but need not, incorporate 
the qualities of  user “communities” for participants, where these are defined as “…
networks of interpersonal ties that provide sociability, support, information, a sense of 
belonging, and social identity.” (Wellman 2002 p. 4).  It will be important to explore the 
nature and functioning of these communities further.  Some recent work on this topic has 
been conducted by Antorini (2005) and by Jeppesen (2004).
In sum, it appears that conditions favorable to horizontal user innovation networks 
often exist today, and that technological advances over time will make conditions more 
favorable still.  It also appears likely that horizontal innovation networks, by and for users, 
both increase individual freedom of choice with respect to products and services and 
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increase social welfare.  An improved understanding of this type of network seems well 
worth striving for.
24
References
Allen, Robert C.  "Collective Invention."  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
4, no.1(March 1983):1-24.
Antorini, Y. M. (2005). “The Making of a Lead User. The Case of Adult Fans of LEGO.” 
Copenhagen Business School. Working Paper.
Baldwin, Carliss Y., Christoph Hienerth and Eric von Hippel (2006) “The migration of 
products from lead user-innovators to manufacturers,” Research Policy, forthcoming
Berger, Alan J. (1975) "Factors Influencing the Locus of Innovation Activity Leading to 
Scientific Instrument and Plastics Innovation."  Unpublished S.M. thesis, Sloan School of 
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
Boyden, Julian W. (1976)  "A Study of the Innovative Process in the Plastics Additives 
Industry."  Unpublished S.M. thesis, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
Cohen,  W.M.,  Nelson,  R.R.,  and Walsh,  J.P.  (2000)  “Protecting  their  Intellectual 
Assets:   Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.  Manufacturing Firms Patent  (or 
not),”  NBER Working Paper 7522.
Dosi, Giovanni (1993) “Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories. A 
Suggested Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change”, 
Research Policy Vol 22 No.2 (April) p. 102 ff
Dosi, Giovanni, L. Marengo and C. Pasquali (2006) “How much should society fuel the 
greed of innovators?  On the relations between appropriability, opportunities and rates of 
innovation.”  (July) Research Policy, forthcoming
Dosi, Giovanni,  R. Nelson and S. Winter (eds.), The Nature and Dynamics of  
Organizational Capabilities, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000
Ekeh, P. P. (1974).  Social Exchange Theory: The Two Traditions.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Enos, John Lawrence. Petroleum Progress and Profits: A History of Process Innovation.  
Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1962.
Franke, Nikolaus, Eric von Hippel and Martin Schreier (2006) “Finding Commercially 
Attractive User Innovations:  A Test of Lead-User Theory”  Journal of Product 
Innovation Management Vol 23 pp. 301-315.
Franke, Nikolaus and Sonali Shah (2003) “How Communities Support Innovative 
Activities: An Exploration of Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users.” Research Policy 
32 (1) p. 157-178.
25
Franke, Nikolaus and Eric von Hippel (2003), “Satisfying Heterogeneous User Needs via 
Innovation Toolkits: The Case of Apache Security Software” Research Policy Vol 32, No. 
7, (July) pp.1199-1215.
Freeman, C.  "Chemical Process Plant: Innovation and the World Market."  National 
Institute Economic Review 45 (August 1968):2957. 
Harhoff, Dietmar, Joachim Henkel and Eric von Hippel (2003) “Profiting from voluntary 
information spillovers: How users benefit from freely revealing their innovations,” 
Research Policy vol 32, No.10 (December) pp.1753-1769
Henkel, Joachim and Eric von Hippel (2005) “Welfare Implications of User Innovation,” 
Journal of Technology Transfer Vol 30 Nos. 1-2 (January) Pages 73-87.
Herstatt, Cornelius, and Eric von Hippel (1992), "From Experience:  Developing New 
Product Concepts Via the Lead User Method: A Case Study in a "Low Tech" Field", 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 1992; 9: 213-221.
Hienerth, Christoph (2006) “The commercialization of user innovations: the development 
of the rodeo kayaking industry”  R&D Management 36 3 pp. 273-294.
Jeppesen, L. B. (2004). “Profiting from Innovative User Communities: How Firms 
Organize the Production of User Modifications in the Computer Games Industry.” 
Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School,  
Copenhagen, Denmark. Working paper WP-04.
Knight, Kenneth E.  "A Study of Technological Innovation: The  Evolution of Digital 
Computers."  Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 
Pittsburgh, PA., 1963.
Lakhani, K. R. and B. Wolf (2005). “Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding 
Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects.” In: J. Feller, B. Fitzgerald, 
S. Hissam, and K.R. Lakhani (eds.), Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lerner, J. and J. Tirole (2002). “Some Simple Economics of Open Source.” Journal of  
Industrial Economics 50(2): 197-234. 
Levin, Richard C.,  Alvin K. Klevorick,  Richard Nelson and Sidney G. Winter (1987), 
"Appropriating  the  Returns  from  Industrial  Research  and  Development",  Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 3, pp. 783-831.
Levy, Steven (1984) Hackers, New York: Anchor/Doubleday
Lim, Kwanghui (2000), "The Many Faces of Absorbtive Capacity: Spillovers of Copper 
Interconnect Technology for Semiconductor Chips," MIT Sloan School of Management 
Working paper # 4110 
Lionetta,  William G.,  Jr.  "Sources  of  Innovation  Within  the  Pultrusion  Industry."  
Unpublished  S.M.  thesis,  Sloan  School  of   Management,  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
26
Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1977. 
Lüthje, C. (2004). “Characteristics of Innovating Users in a Consumer Goods Field: An 
Empirical Study of Sport-Related Product Consumers.” Technovation (September)
Lüthje, Christian, Cornelius Herstatt and Eric von Hippel (2005), “User-innovators and 
“local” information: The case of mountain biking,” Research Policy, Vol 34, No. 6 
(August) pp. 951-965.
Mansfield, Edwin (1968)  Industrial Research and Technological Innovation: An 
Econometric Analysis.  New York: W.W. Norton.
Mansfield,  E.  (1985).  “How  Rapidly Does  New  Industrial  Technology Leak  Out?,” 
Journal of Industrial Economics. Vol. 34, pp. 217-223. 
Morrison, Pamela D., John H. Roberts and Eric von Hippel (2000), “Determinants of User 
Innovation and Innovation Sharing in a Local Market,” Management Science, 46, 12 
(December), pp1513-1527.
Niedner, Sven, Guido Hertel and Stefanie Hermann, (2000) “Motivation in Open Source 
Projects,” http://www.psychologie.uni-kiel.de/linux-study/
Ogawa,  Susumu  (1997),  „Does  sticky  information  affect  the  locus  of  innovation? 
Evidence from the Japanese convenience-store  industry“  Research Policy Vol.  26,  pp. 
777-790.
O'Mahony, S. (2003). “Guarding the Commons: How Open Source Contributors Protect 
their Work.” Research Policy 32(7): 1179–1198.
Pine, J. B. II. (1993). Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Raymond, Eric S. (1999),  The Cathedral & the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open  
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary, (Cambridge: O’Reilly)
Riggs, William and Eric von Hippel (1994), "The Impact of Scientific and Commercial 
Values on the Sources of Scientific Instrument Innovation,"  Research Policy 23 (July): 
459-469.
Rosenberg, Nathan "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840-1910," 
Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge, 1976, chapter 1; also see "Uncertainty and 
Technological Change," in Landau, Taylor and Wright, The Mosaic of Economic Growth, 
Stanford 1996, esp. pp. 345-47.
Scherer, F. M. et al. (1959), Patents and the Corporation, 2nd ed. Boston: James Galvin 
and Associates.
27
Schmookler, Jacob.  Invention and Economic Growth.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1966.
Shah, Sonali (2000) “Sources and Patterns of Innovation in a Consumer Products Field: 
Innovations in Sporting Equipment” Sloan Working Paper #4105 (May) 
Taylor, C. T. and Z.A. Silberston (1973)  The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A 
Study of the British Experience Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tietz, Robert, Pamela Morrison, Christian Lüthje and Cornelius Herstatt (2005), “The 
process of user-innovation: a case study in a consumer goods setting.”  International 
Journal of Product Development, Vol 2, No. 4, pp. 321-338.
Urban, Glen L.,  and Eric von Hippel (1988), "Lead User Analyses for the Development 
of New Industrial Products,"  Management Science 34, no. 5 (May):569-82.
VanderWerf, Pieter A. "Product tying and innovation in U.S. wire preparation 
equipment," Research Policy 19 (1990): 83-96.
von Hippel, Eric (1977) "The Dominant Role of the User in Semiconductor and Electronic 
Subassembly Process Innovation," IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 
EM-24, no. 2 (May):60-71.
von Hippel, Eric (1976) "The Dominant Role of Users in the Scientific Instrument 
Innovation Process," Research Policy  5, no. 3 (July):212-39.
von Hippel, Eric (1988) The Sources of Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press).
von Hippel, Eric (2005) Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge: MIT Press).
von Hippel, Eric (1994) "Sticky Information" and the Locus of Problem Solving: 
Implications for Innovation"   Management Science 40, no.4 (April): 429-439.
von  Hippel,  E.  and  S.  N. Finkelstein  (1979),  “Analysis  of  Innovation  in  Automated 
Clinical Chemistry Analyzers,” Science & Public Policy, 6, 1, 24-37.
von Hippel, Eric and Georg von Krogh (2003), “Open Source Software and the “Private-
Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science” Organization Science 14 
(2) 208-223.
Wellman, Barry, Jeffrey Boase and Wenhong Chen (2002) “The Networked Nature of 
Community On and Off the Internet” Working paper, Centre for Urban & Community 
Studies, University of Toronto (May)
28
